[V]oyez ce qui est advenu de ce que nous avons eu, un seul instant, un homme à caractère français à notre Foreign Office [Palmerston] . Vous savez que j'aime la France, mais j'avoue qu'il en est assez d'une seule en Europe.
( J.S. Mill, letter to Alexis de Tocqueville, 20 February 1843) It is difficult, we are inclined to say impossible, to state what is the doctrine of France on this, and indeed on any point of international law. During the last two hundred years she has tried almost every form of government, almost every kind of ruler, and almost every variety of fortune. … Her external policy has of course been influenced in its details by her fortunes. But … it has been directed by one leading principle. That principle is -that France, or, as she usually calls herself, the Great Nation, is entitled, directly or indirectly, by actual coercion or by influence, to govern the rest of Europe; and that all means are to be adopted, and all principles are to be avowed, by which that end can be obtained.
It is well known that, on the French side, a perception of English perfidy has been persistent and all but unanimous. Not that this was a French peculiarity. Nor was it a recent phenomenon. At least as early as the twelfth century German authors were complaining about perfidia anglica. And, in the thirteenth century, Spanish texts blamed the English of treachery, adding that they 'have false hearts'. As Eugen Weber has remarked, this attribution of treachery to the English 'would in time become commonplace'. 2 Increased contact and familiarity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries only confirmed the image and gave it concrete 'evidence'. As one would expect, the successive wars of the eighteenth century and then the wars of the French Revolution and the Empire did not make things better. 'Perfidious Albion' had a selfish foreign policy, wanted to divide and rule, was obsessed with acquiring new markets, and certainly could not be trusted. According to H.D. Schmidt, from the beginning of 1794 onwards, there was a deliberate and systematic government policy of raising French sentiments of hostility towards England, initiated by Robespierre and continued by his successors of the Directory, who launched 'a campaign of hatred on a nation-wide scale'. This policy was continued and perfected by Napoleon. Classicism contributed, and the Roman idea of Punic perfidy was enlisted: Albion, the modern maritime and commercial power, was the new Carthage, and had to be destroyed by the French, who saw themselves as the successors to the Romans and Cato.
3 By the time of the Middle East crisis of 1840, the view of English bad faith, disloyalty and treacherousness was all but universal in France. As Martyn Cornick has argued, Larousse's Grand Dictionnaire universel came to add credibility and 'scientific' respectability to the stereotype in its entries on England and the English, especially the long one on 'Albion'. 4 Thus, it is not accidental that even England's foremost champions and admirers in France failed to controvert those particular aspects of criticisms against their object of admiration that referred to its foreign policy.
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In the light of all this, a question arises inescapably. Did British political thinkers in the nineteenth century have anything like an equivalent to the French stereotype of 'perfidious Albion'? A tentative straightforward answer can be given from the beginning: Yes, there was a rather persistent picture of the French in terms of their comportment in foreign affairs, which was, all British thinkers agreed more or less, a direct consequence of their national character. In their international behaviour the French were warlike; volatile; easily excitable; easily susceptible to being seduced by leaders promising them glory abroad; vindictive and envious vis-à-vis the English; unfair and impervious to considerations of justice; not respectful of international treaties, law and conventions; overambitious; inordinately vain, touchy and other such unpleasant things.
Such national characterology with regard to international attitudes and comportment received a particular additional impetus from the early Victorian period onwards. There are reasons for that. In the first place, one has to remember the general preoccupation with 'character'
